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Privatized Returns and Socialized Risks: CEO Incentives, Securitization 
Accounting and the Financial Crisis 
 
Michele Fabrizi* & Antonio Parbonettiǂ 
 
Abstract 
 
The paper investigates the role of CEO’s equity and risk incentives in boosting securitization 
in the financial industry and in motivating executives to reduce the perceived risk while betting 
on it. Using a sample of US financial institutions over the period 2003-2009 we document that 
CEOs with high equity incentives have systematically engaged in securitization transactions 
to a larger extent than CEOs with low incentives. We also show that CEOs with high equity 
and risk-related incentives have engaged in the securitization of risky loans and have used 
securitization for transferring risks to outside investors. Finally, we show that executives 
incentivized on risk have provided outside investors with low quality disclosure about losses 
recorded on securitized loans thus contributing to increase the opacity of securitization 
transactions undertaken. Overall, we interpret our results as evidence that CEOs have 
foreseen in securitizations under US GAAP an opportunity for hiding risks while bearing them 
and generating profits and cash flows because of the risks. Our results are robust to several 
model specifications as well as to endogeneity concerns. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
From 2000 to 2006 the amount of loans securitized almost doubled while the securitization of 
risky subprime mortgages grew by almost eight times, exceeding 800 billion US dollars at the 
end of 2006.  Whether highly incentivized CEOs have foreseen in securitizations under US 
GAAP an opportunity for hiding risks while bearing them and generating profits and cash 
flows because of the risks is an open issue that this paper is going to explore. 
Securitizations transform illiquid assets into liquid securities and transactions that qualify for 
sale accounting offer several benefits that make them particularly appealing to bank 
originators. First, securitization enables financial institutions to optimally choose their 
exposure to the credit risk of loans generated (Jiangli and Pritsker, 2008). Second, 
securitization enables banks to replace illiquid loans with cash, improving banks’ liquidity. 
Third, financial institutions subject to regulatory capital requirements trough securitizations 
increase regulatory capital ratios and free up regulatory capital. Fourth, securitization allows 
banks to increase their profitability through “gains on sale”.  
However, financial intermediation theories point out severe concerns over the effects of such 
transactions. A single lender has strong incentives to monitor stemming from holding illiquid 
loans on its balance sheet, while separating loans’ originator and the bearer of loans’ default 
risk might induce lax screening (Diamond, 1984). Consistently, the recent financial crisis has 
shown a large rate of delinquencies among the heavily securitized non-agency mortgages. 
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Additionally, securitization generates frictions (Ashcraft and Schuermann, 2008). The 
transferor of loans has superior information with respect to the transferee and this creates 
moral hazard and adverse selection problems.  Rajan (2006, p. 500) adds to those concerns 
the idea that the changes in the financial sector have altered managerial incentives, which in 
turn have altered the nature of risks undertaken by the system, with potential distortions.  
Therefore, understanding the determinants of risk taking behaviors in the banking industry 
and the role of equity and risk taking incentives is of prominent importance because several 
factors that are unique to this setting affect risk-taking strategies. 
First, financial institution being highly levered have incentives to engage in excess risk-taking, 
as shown by Jensen and Meckling (1976). Second, financial institutions raise debts trough 
depositors or the direct access to Central Banks and, as a consequence, the increase in the 
level of risk does not necessarily translate into an increase in the cost of debt. Typically, 
depositors are small uninformed investors with deposits insured by the government as thus 
they lack the incentives and the abilities to monitor investments’ decision and risk profile. 
Third, because the failure of one bank may generate a contagion effect, governments provide 
both explicit and implicit guarantees. As a consequence, the debt markets do not adjust the 
terms of their credit to account for the change in the bank risk profile. Consistent with this 
view, Haldane (2011) documents that in the pre-crisis period the credit default swap markets 
did not distinguish strong from weak banks.  
Therefore, given the absence of debt markets constrain in the level of risk, risk incentives 
stemming from stock and option compensation might have a free reign in banks. This problem 
is further exacerbated if accounting regimes reduce the efficacy of capital adequacy 
requirements aimed at limiting risk taking behaviors.  
To address our research questions we collect data from 10-K filings on the percentage of 
loans securitized and the amount of losses recorded on these loans for a sample of US 
financial institutions for the period 2003-2009. Moreover, we retrieve data on the financial 
institutions most involved in the securitization of subprime loans from a proprietary database 
that collects information on issuer of subprime securitizations in the US. We conduct our 
analysis in four steps, each of which speaking to the role of CEO’s equity and risk incentives 
in boosting securitizations and in motivating executives to transfers risks to outside investors. 
In our research design we control for CEO’s incentives being potentially endogenous with 
respect to securitization using a two-stage least-squares (2SLS) approach.  
In the first set of analyses we investigate the association between CEO’s equity and risk 
incentives and total securitization. We document that CEOs with high levels of equity 
incentives engaged more in securitizations than executives with low equity incentives. This 
finding suggests that CEOs have foresaw in securitizations under US GAAP an opportunity to 
boost stock price by generating cash flow, enhancing profits or freeing up regulatory capital. 
In the second set of analyses, we shift our focus from banks’ decision to engage in 
securitizations to the quality of the assets transferred and the choice of opportunistically 
transferring off balance the risks generated. We document that CEOs with high equity and 
risk incentives engaged to a larger extent in the securitization of risky loans than low 
incentivized executives and they transferred risk to outside investors by moving off-balance 
the riskiest loans. These results are consistent with the fact that securitization allowed CEOs 
to engage in risky lending activities and subsequently hiding the risks generated from the 
books, thus offering the opportunity to reduce the perceived risk while betting on it. Third, in 
order to provide further insights on the opportunistic behavior of CEOs when transferring risks 
off-balance, we investigate the relation between CEO’s incentives and the level of disclosure 
linked to securitization transactions. We find that CEO’s risk incentives are negatively related 
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to the quality of securitization disclosure. This result suggests that CEOs incentivized on risk 
were less prone to provide information on the quality of loans transferred off-balance. This 
finding further corroborates the idea that risk incentives have motivated CEOs to 
opportunistically take advantage from information asymmetry generated by securitization 
transactions. Fourth, we document that before the collapse of the subprime mortgage market 
in 2007, financial institutions involved in the securitization of subprime loans largely over 
performed other banks in terms of stock returns and accounting earnings. On the contrary, 
starting from 2007, subprime securitizers recorded worse performances than other financial 
institutions that were not involved in subprime securitization. Moreover, subprime securitizers 
were able to distribute more dividends than the peers. This is consistent with the fact that by 
securitizing risky loans banks were successful in boosting stock prices, increasing earnings 
and allowing dividend distribution but the risks undertaken turned out to be extremely costly.  
This paper contributes to several research streams. First, we contribute to the debate about 
compensation and risk taking in financial institutions showing that highly incentivized CEOs 
have used securitization to hide risks while betting on them. At the best of our knowledge this 
is the first paper that provide evidence that compensating CEOs of financial institutions as 
CEOs of industrial companies might be detrimental, supporting John et al. (2000, p. 97) 
analytical model which purports for a “a prominent role for managerial compensation in bank 
regulation”. Second, we add to the emerging research strand investigating the role of CEO’s 
compensation in the financial crisis. Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) provide evidence that 
banks where CEOs had high equity incentives performed significantly worse during the crisis 
than banks where CEOs had low incentives. We complement this result as we show that 
CEOs with high equity incentives systematically engaged in securitization transactions to a 
larger extent than CEOs with low levels of equity compensation and that they also securitized 
risky loans such as subprime mortgages. Third, we add to the growing research stream 
analyzing the determinants and effects of securitization transactions (Chen et al. 2008; 
Landsman et al. 2008; Dechow and Shakespeare 2009; Dechow et al. 2010; Amiram et al. 
2011; Cheng et al. 2011; Barth et al. 2012). We contribute to this debate by focusing the 
analysis on the financial industry and documenting the relationship existing between CEO’s 
equity compensation and securitization transactions considered a powerful tool to boost 
performance. We therefore bring into the research framework direct evidence about one of 
the fundamental causes underlying securitization transactions that have been overlooked by 
previous literature. Fourth, at the best of our knowledge this paper is the first to formally 
investigate the level of disclosure linked to securitization transactions as a proxy for CEO’s 
opportunistic behaviors. 
Concluding, our results answer to the increasing demand for evidence on the role of CEO’s 
incentives on the financial crisis that led economists to claims that “we're all paying now 
because skewed financial incentives led to too many big bets” (Solomon and Paletta, 2009). 
 
 
2. BACKGROUND 
 
Asset securitization consists in converting illiquid assets, usually small loans that could 
not be separately sold, into liquid securities (ABSs) that are sold to investors in the financial 
market. By dividing, repackaging and distributing risks within the financial system 
securitizations transform risks into an “easily tradable commodity” (Haldane 2008, p. 32) 
triggering a shift from the traditional “originating and holding” banking business model to the 
“originating and selling”.  
Please do not quote, cite, distribute or copy without the consent of the authors 
 
4 
The securitization process, illustrated in Figure 1, substitutes the close relationship 
between borrower and lender with a long chain which starts when the originator, typically a 
commercial bank or another financial institution, generates loans. The originator transfers the 
loans to a special purpose entity (SPE) becoming a sponsor of the SPE. The role of the SPE 
is to manage the loan pool and issue ABSs that give investors the right to receive the cash 
flows originated from the underlying loans. When the SPE issues ABSs, it divides them into 
different tranches (senior, mezzanine and junior) which have different returns and levels of 
risk, as reflected by ratings received by rating agencies. Finally, the amounts paid by the 
investors for the ABSs are transferred to the originator/sponsor that thus replaces the illiquid 
loans previously held in the balance sheet with cash. 
 
 
Figure 1. The figure represents a typical securitization process 
 
This long chain linking borrowers with investors is a mix of on balance and off-balance sheet 
conduits that generate at every additional link in the chain an increase in the scope of 
information gaps (Chen et al. 2008). These information asymmetries combined with the 
favorable accounting treatment prescribed by SFAS 140 generate the opportunities to hide 
the risks generated and to bet on them. 
Under SFAS 140, almost all securitizations were accounted for as a sale with the 
consequence that loans are derecognized from the balance sheet of the originator. Two are 
the most critical issues about the accounting for securitization: a) derecognition; and b) 
consolidation. SFAS 140 using a “financial component approach”1 allows to decompose 
assets into a variety of components whose accounting treatment depends on whether the 
transferor has surrendered control or not. Moreover, to eliminate definitively assets from 
balance sheet, the transferor has also to avoid the consolidation of SPEs (special purpose 
entities). Under SFAS 140 a QSPE (qualified special purpose entity) was “automatically” 
excluded from consolidation and the accounting standard required that a qualifying SPE has 
                                                 
1
 SFAS 140, issued in 2000, introduced the financial component approach for the asset derecognition problem. 
FIGURE I
The Securitization Process
Borrower A
Originator SPE
Rating 
Agencies
Investors
$ $ $
Loans
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Pool ABSsBorrower B
…
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to be demonstrably distinct from the transferor and significantly limited in its activities. 
Understanding whether a SPE is a QSPE required judgment and involved discretionality 
typically used to avoid the consolidation of the vehicle.  
A central point surrounding securitizations is that these transactions might have reduced the 
incentives of financial intermediaries to carefully screen borrowers. For a lender to screen and 
monitor it must be given appropriate incentives and this can be provided by the illiquid loans 
on its balance sheet (Holmström and Tirole 1997; Diamond and Rajan 2009). When banks 
replace illiquid loans with cash thanks to securitization, they might lose the appropriate level 
of incentives to properly monitor the quality of loans granted. In this line, Keys et al. (2010) 
investigate the relationship between securitization and screening standards in the context of 
subprime mortgage loans and find that existing securitization practices did adversely affect 
the screening incentives of subprime lenders. 
By eliminating loans from the balance sheet, securitization transactions also provide the 
originator with the benefit of reducing risk based capital (Jones, 2000; Acharya and 
Richardson, 2009). The critical point is that even when the bank’s originator buys back the 
most junior tranches of ABSs, loans are eliminated from banks’ balance sheet. Because of 
this explicit guarantee that represents an important credit enhancement mechanism, the bank 
originator still continues to bear the risks arising from the loans. Consistent with the view that 
securitizations do not lead to a shift of the risks of the underlying loans, Barth et al. (2012) 
show that the bond market perceive firm’s credit risk as associated with both the retained and 
the non-retained portion of securitized assets. Moreover, Landsman et al. (2008) show that 
the stock market treats securitized assets and liabilities held by a SPE as belonging to the 
sponsor-originator. However, because of the lack of coordination among accounting 
standards, regulatory capital requirements and tax law, an originator can increase the income 
and the level of risk without increasing the required TIER 1. 
Finally as the interest rate of the pool of loans increases, the earnings arising from a 
securitization increase too. Therefore the more the subprimes securitized the greater the 
earnings realized, but because of the implicit and explicit guarantee provided by the originator 
bank, the earnings are deeply rooted into risks2. Additionally, securitizations with further 
involvement, as in the presence of retained interest, do not trigger a taxable sale event, thus 
generating a greater positive impact on income. 
Because banks’ risk profile is likely to be affected by CEO’s equity compensation and most 
securitization transactions appear to be deeply rooted into risk, we analyze whether highly 
incentivized CEOs’ use securitizations to reduce the perceived risk while betting on it. The 
idea that compensation programs are one of the determinants of the misalignment of 
incentives and conflicts of interest that permeate the “securitization chain” has also been 
confirmed by the Bank for International Settlements (2011), thus making the research 
question even more intriguing and timely.  
 
 
3. TESTABLE PREDICTIONS 
We develop our predictions distinguishing among two separate but complementary aspects 
of CEO’s stock and option compensation: equity and risk incentives. Equity incentives are 
defined as the variation in executive’s wealth caused by a change in stock price and 
                                                 
2
 Sidel et al. (2008) reported in the Wall Street Journal that Citigroup decide to provide emergency support for 
seven of its SPEs. As a consequence of this decision, Citigroup brought $49 billion of SPEs assets and related 
liabilities onto its balance sheet. 
Please do not quote, cite, distribute or copy without the consent of the authors 
 
6 
therefore measure the strength of CEO’s incentives to increase the value of firm’s stock. Risk 
incentives, instead, are defined as the variation in executive’s wealth caused by a change in 
stock price volatility and therefore measure the strength of CEO’s incentives to increase 
firm’s risk profile (Core et al., 2003). 
 
Equity incentives and securitization activity 
When securitization transactions qualify for sale accounting, as almost all securitizations did 
under SFAS 140, they offer several benefits that make them particularly appealing to the 
originator. First, securitization enables banks to optimally choose their exposure to the credit 
risk of loans generated (Jiangli and Pritsker 2008). In fact, through securitization activities 
banks can decide which loans to fund on balance sheet and which to sell outside. Second, 
securitization enables banks to replace illiquid loans with cash, thus improving banks’ liquidity 
and multiplying banks’ resources available for being invested in the lending activity. 
Furthermore, as previously discussed, if the financial institution is subject to regulatory capital 
requirements, securitization transactions under US GAAP allow to increase regulatory capital 
ratios and free up regulatory capital. Third, securitization allows banks which are efficient in 
originating certain asset types, for instance credit card receivables, to improve market share 
without creating balance sheet concentration (Bank for International Settlements, 2011). 
Fourth, if an originator is able to achieve off-balance sheet accounting treatment, the removal 
of balance sheet assets improves certain financial ratios, such as the leverage capital ratio or 
return on assets. In addition, sales treatment could increase non-interest income, which 
combined with the capital requirements improve the originator’s return on equity (Bank for 
International Settlements, 2011). Fifth, securitization allows banks to increase their profitability 
through “gains on sale”. In fact, under SFAS 140 banks could record a gain equal to the 
difference between the allocated book value of sold components and net proceeds from 
securitization. Moreover, as the interest rate of the pool of loans increases the earnings 
arising from a securitization increase too. Thus the more the subprime loans securitized the 
more the earnings realized but because of the implicit and explicit guarantee provided by the 
originator the earnings are deeply rooted into risks3. In fact subprime-mortgage-related 
positions, even the most junior, generally have experienced good investment performance as 
long as home prices appreciate and debt markets are sufficiently liquid (Ryan, 2008). 
In a nutshell, securitizations under US GAAP had the potential of greatly improving banks’ 
shareholder value: simply put, securitization gives the bank more options for funding its 
activities and managing its risk profile and, all else equal, expanded opportunities should 
increase bank’s value (Jiangli and Pritsker, 2008). Moreover, the profit opportunities offered 
by subprime securitizations have led experts in the industry to define these financial 
transactions as “a machine that just manufactures earnings out of thin air” (Browning, 2007). 
Given securitization’s potentiality for boosting shareholder value, we conjecture that CEOs 
whose wealth is more tightly linked to firm’s stock price have greater incentives to engage in 
securitization of risky and non risky loans  than CEOs with low equity incentives, in order to 
maximize the value of their equity holding. As a consequence, we posit the following research 
hypothesis: 
 
H1: Equity incentives positively affect the securitization of risky and non risky loans  
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Risky incentives and subprime securitization activity 
CEO’s equity compensation can also influence the riskiness of the securitization transactions 
undertaken.  
Suppose, for instance, that the bank can invest either in a subprime loan pool or in a prime 
loan pool, both with a duration of 10 years. If the bank chooses the subprime loans there is an 
 percent chance that the investment will create a wealth of W0 in the next ten years and a (1-
) percent chance that the investment will create a wealth of W2 in the same time period. 
Alternatively, the bank can grant the prime loans that create a wealth of W1 with  =100, being 
W2 >> W1 > W0. Since shareholders are well diversified they would prefer the risky scenario 
and betting on the possibility of increasing bank’s wealth to W2. In fact, as holders of a call 
option on the firm which can be exercised at any time when firm’s equity exceed the value of 
debt (Merton, 1974), shareholders benefit entirely for the upside with limited losses on the 
downside. Thus in companies with limited liability shareholders have a strong incentive to 
increase the riskiness of the investments. In order to induce CEOs to choose the risky 
scenario, shareholders can give CEOs option grants thus increasing their wealth sensitivity to 
changes in stock volatility. In this line, Coles et al. (2006) document that higher sensitivity of 
CEO wealth to stock volatility leads executives to implement riskier policy. Nonetheless, as 
stock and option-based compensation increases the executive’s personal portfolio becomes 
less diversified and the executive becomes more risk averse and more likely to pursue 
strategies aimed at mitigating the risk of the institution (Smith and Stulz, 1985). Moreover high 
levels of perceived risks can negatively affect a manager’s tenure and job security (Ronen 
and Sadan, 1981; Carlson and Bathala, 1997) and can harm her reputational and human 
capital. As a consequence, it could be possible that, even if CEOs are provided with risk 
incentives, they prefer the low risk scenario that ensures W1 instead of betting on risky lending 
activities that could deliver W2 but also W0.  
The use of securitization allows to deeply changing the timing of the pay-off for the 
undiversified executive in the presence of high risk incentives. In fact, the executive can 
choose to invest in the subprime loan pool and securitize it. In this scenario the bank 
immediately records the gains and revenues and get W2 while the negative outcome W0 
remains delayed over time until the bank has to eventually record the loss on the retained 
interest. As a consequence, the securitization makes the risky scenario much more appealing 
to undiversified executives that are incentivized on risk. In fact, by changing the timing of the 
payoff, the securitization allows undiversified but risk incentivized CEOs to bet on risky 
scenarios while delaying any negative outcome related to them that might negatively affect 
their tenure, job security and human capital. This argument is consistent with results in Grant 
et al. (2009) showing that risk-averse managers incentivized to take risks smooth income with 
the goal to reduce the perceived risk and create accounting reserves to cover potential 
losses.  Therefore we expect a positive relationship between CEO’s risk incentives and the 
securitization of risky loans. 
Thus we posit the following prediction: 
 
H2: Risk incentives positively affect the securitization of risky loans  
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4. DATA 
 
4.1  Sample Selection 
For the purpose of our analysis we identify all financial institutions (SIC codes between 6000-
6300) available on Execucomp dataset in fiscal year 2003 and we keep all observations with 
an identifiable CEO throughout 2003-2009. In order to mitigate any possible survivorship bias, 
we augment our sample including financial institutions that have been delisted during the 
financial crisis but that have at least five years of data starting fiscal year 2003, thus assuring 
that we have information on these institutions at least until 2007 when the crisis has started. 
For our sample banks, we hand collect data on securitization activities from 10-K filings using 
disclosure under SFAS 140; we retrieve control variables from Compustat, Compustat Bank 
and CRSP; and we collect compensation data from Execucomp dataset and 10-K filings. We 
ended up with a final sample of 526 firm-year observations over the period 2003-2009 
generated by 81 unique financial institutions. Table I describes the sample selection process 
and the distribution of observations over time. Out of 526 firm-year observations, about the 
40% reports securitization transactions thus confirming that the use of securitization practices 
has been a concentrated phenomenon in the financial industry.  
 
 
                Table I. The table describes the sample selection process and the sample composition 
 
670
128
16
Firm-Year Observations 526
Unique Firms 81
Year # obs
2003 78
2004 76
2005 76
2006 78
2007 79
2008 72
2009 67
Total 526
Firm-year observazions without securitizations 318 60%
Firm-year observazions with securitizations 208 40%
Total 526 100%
TABLE I
Sample Selection and Composition
Financial institutions with missing information on other variables
Financial institutions (SIC codes between 6000-6300) available on 
Execucomp dataset in fiscal year 2003
minus
Financial institutions with missing information on securitization 
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4.2. Variable Measurement 
 
Securitization  
We hand collect data on banks’ securitization activities from 10-K filings. Specifically, we use 
disclosure under SFAS 140 that requires institutions to provide information on securitized 
financial assets4. In order to rule out the possibility that our analysis is driven by a size effect, 
we scale loans securitized by the amount of total loans managed (sum of total securitized and 
withheld loans) by the bank and create the variable Securitization. For financial institutions 
engaging in securitization transactions we also retrieve the amount of credit losses on 
securitized loans and we create a variable (Loss Secur) that computes the percentage of 
credit loss on securitized loans. We interpret this variable as a proxy of the riskiness of 
securitization transactions undertaken by the bank. Given that most losses on securitized 
assets have been recorded during the financial crisis, it is an essential feature of our research 
design to collect data until 2009 and not limiting the analysis to the pre-crisis period5. 
Similarly, we create a proxy of the riskiness of non-securitized loans (Loss Loans) defined as 
the percentage losses on loans withheld on balance sheet. Finally we define a variable (Diff in 
Losses) that computes the difference between the percentage loss on securitized assets and 
the percentage loss on withheld loans. Thus, higher values of Diff in Losses indicate that 
executives transferred risk embedded in loans to outside investors through securitization.  
 
CEO’s incentives  
As emphasized by Core et al. (2003), executive incentives from stocks and options are 
properly measured only considering portfolio incentives. In fact, the amount of newly granted 
restricted stocks and options is not sufficient for evaluating the amount of incentives the 
executive is provided with (Yermack 1995). We measure CEO’s equity incentives (Equity 
Incentives) as the dollar change in the value of executive’s stock and option holdings that 
would come from a one percentage point increase in the company stock price. The sensitivity 
of CEO’s stock holding is simply computed multiplying the number of shares held by the 1% 
of the stock price at fiscal year-end, while for computing the sensitivity of CEO’s option 
holding we take the partial derivative of the Black-Scholes equation with respect to stock price 
(option’s Delta) as shown in Appendix A. Starting from the fiscal year 2006, Execucomp 
reports all the information necessary for computing the sensitivity of CEO’s equity portfolio to 
a one percentage point increase in the stock price. For observations preceding 2006 we use 
Core and Guay (2002)’s methodology for estimating the delta of executives’ option portfolio. 
In particular, CEO’s options are divided into three groups (options awarded during the year, 
options awarded in previous years but not yet exercisable and options granted in previous 
years and currently exercisable) and separate estimates of the delta are computed. Core and 
Guay (2002) show that their proxy captures more than 99% of the variation in option portfolio 
value and sensitivity. To reduce the influence of extreme values, in regression analyses we 
use the log transformation of Equity Incentives. 
                                                 
4
 Two caveats apply. First, banks do not report data on non material securitizations and we consider these 
amounts equal to zero. On the contrary if the bank reports evidence of securitizations but the disclosure 
provided in the 10-K filing does not allow to understand the exact amount of assets securitized the observation is 
deleted. Second, disclosure under SFAS 140 applies to securitization transactions in which the bank has 
retained interests. Since this is the case for most securitizations the effect on the analysis is trivial. 
5
 We limit the analysis to 2009 because starting from fiscal year 2010 new accounting standards for 
securitization apply and this would affect the analysis. 
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We measure CEO risk-related incentives (Risk Incentives) in a methodology similar to that 
used by Rogers (2002, 2005) and Grant et al. (2009), namely the Vega of CEO’s stock 
options divided by their Delta. We compute CEO’s option Vega as the sensitivity of CEO’s 
option holding to a unit change in stock price volatility by using the first derivative of the Black-
Scholes option-pricing model in relation to firm’s volatility as described in Appendix A. When 
necessary we used Core and Guay (2002)’s methodology to retrieve the data for computing 
options’ Vega and Delta. Computing CEO’s risk-incentives using the Vega-to-Delta ratio has 
the advantage of reducing multicollinearity problems between the sensitivity of CEO’s equity 
portfolio to stock price and stock volatility that is particularly severe in small samples.  
In the analysis we also control for the age of the CEO (Log Age). Including CEO’s age in the 
analysis allows us to control for potential effects linked to CEO’s career concerns that might 
influence securitization activities. The underlying idea is that career concerns are higher for 
young versus old managers since they have to influence market’s beliefs about their ability 
(Holmström, 1999). 
 
Bank’s characteristics 
In an attempt to control for confounding variables that might influence the level of 
securitization observed we include in the multivariate analysis a set of bank-related 
characteristics. B_M is the equity book-to-market ratio computed as the book value of equity 
divided by its market value at fiscal year-end; Returns is bank’s annual market returns; Size is 
the natural logarithm of total assets; Change Assets is the percentage change in total assets 
with respect to the previous year as control for potential M&A activities; Change Tier 1 proxies 
for regulatory capital constraints and it is computed as the percentage change in Tier 1 with 
respect to the previous year; Interest Income is net interest income divided by total revenues 
as a proxy for bank business model; GDP is the gross domestic product that controls for 
macroeconomics trends that might influence securitization activities. Moreover all analyses 
include year fixed effects. 
 
4.3.  Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Table II, Panel A reports descriptive statistics of the main variables used in the analysis while 
Panel B presents Pearson correlation coefficients. Data on Securitization show that, on 
average, financial institutions in our final sample securitize about the 11% of managed loans. 
The highly asymmetric distribution of the variable is driven by a large part of observations 
taking value of zero because of no (or immaterial) securitization activities6. When computed 
only considering banks involved in securitization transactions, untabulated results show that 
the average value of Securitization is 0.27 with banks in the 90th percentile securitizing an 
amount of loans equal to the 64% of the managed portfolio. Our research design aims at 
exploiting this variability in the data in order to analyze if CEO’s incentives can explain part of 
it.  
As expected, the correlation matrix reported in Panel B shows that old CEOs and CEOs in 
large bank have higher levels of equity incentives than their colleagues that are in the early 
stage of the career or that guide smaller institutions. The level of equity incentives is also 
strongly positively correlated with bank’s performance and growth opportunities while the 
relation reverses sign when examining risk incentives. On the contrary, large financial 
institutions provide CEOs not only with high levels of equity incentives but also with high risk 
incentives with respect to smaller banks. 
                                                 
6
 We incorporate this feature of the data in our empirical analysis by using Tobit models. 
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Table II. Panel A presents descriptive statistics for the main variables included in the analysis while Panel B reports Pearson correlation coefficients.  
Securitization is the total amount of financial assets that have been transfer off-balance through securitization, divided by the amount of total loans 
managed; Diff in Losses is the difference between the percentage of credit losses on securitized loans and the percentage of credit losses on withheld 
loans; Equity Incentives is the logarithm of the dollar change in the value of CEO's stock and option holdings that would come from a one percentage 
point increase in the company stock price; Risk Incentives is the Vega of CEO’s stock options divided by their Delta; Log Age is the log transformation 
of CEO’s age; B_M is the book value of equity divided by its market value; Returns is annual returns; Size is the logarithm of total assets; Change 
Assets is the percentage change in total assets with respect to the previous year; Change Tier 1 is the percentage change in Tier 1 with respect to the 
previous year; Interest Income is net interest income standardized by total revenues 
*,**,*** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. P-values are two tailed. 
N Mean SD p25 p50 p75
Securitization 526 0.107 0.204 0.000 0.000 0.108
Diff in Losses 162 0.007 0.023 -0.005 0.000 0.019
Equity Incentives 526 5.786 1.786 4.849 5.947 7.033
Risk Incentives 526 0.905 0.721 0.400 0.783 1.209
Log Age 526 4.031 0.115 3.951 4.043 4.111
B_M 526 0.806 0.881 0.399 0.550 0.822
Returns 526 0.033 0.395 -0.120 0.096 0.238
Size 526 10.175 1.717 8.919 9.905 11.348
Change Assets 526 0.112 0.171 0.014 0.084 0.170
Change Tier 1 526 0.026 0.185 -0.062 0.000 0.078
Interest Income 526 0.427 0.164 0.334 0.434 0.534
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 Securitization 1.000
2 Diff in Losses 0.121 1.000
3 Equity Incentives 0.271*** 0.073 1.000
4 Risk Incentives 0.046 0.068 -0.267*** 1.000
5 Log Age -0.185*** -0.195* 0.216*** -0.034 1.000
6 B_M 0.011 0.043 -0.361*** 0.480*** 0.007 1.000
7 Returns 0.011 0.078 0.249*** -0.494*** 0.010 -0.496*** 1.000
8 Size 0.396*** 0.100 0.432*** 0.231*** 0.061 0.018 -0.099* 1.000
9 Change Assets 0.086* 0.071 0.265*** -0.207*** 0.007 -0.223*** 0.198*** 0.060 1.000
10 Change Tier 1 -0.001 -0.015 -0.067 0.120** -0.002 0.110* 0.005 0.024 -0.090* 1.000
11 Interest Income -0.307*** -0.040 -0.286*** -0.021 -0.059 -0.052 0.056 -0.435*** -0.003 0.031
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of the main variables
Panel B: Correlation Matrix
TABLE II
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations
Please do not quote, cite, distribute or copy without the consent of the authors 
 
 
12 
5. EMPIRICAL ANALYSES 
Our two research hypotheses predict that CEO’s equity incentives determine both the total 
amount of securitizations undertaken by financial institutions and the quality of loans 
securitized, while risk-related incentives only determine the securitizations of risky loans.  
To test the effect of equity compensation on banks’ total securitization activities we first group 
banks into quintiles according to the level of CEO’s equity incentives and report the amount of 
securitization for each group of financial institutions. Table III, Panel A shows that as one 
moves from the first to the fifth quintile of the distribution of CEO’s equity incentives, the 
amount of loans securitized steadily increases thus providing preliminary support for the role 
of CEO’s equity incentives in boosting securitizations. To better investigate H1 we estimate 
the following Tobit model with year fixed effects and heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors 
clustered at firm-level: 
 
Securitizationi,t = 0 + 1Equity Incentivesi,t + 2Risk Incentivesi,t + 3Log Agei,t + 4B_Mi,t + 
5Returnsi,t + 6Sizei,t + 7Change Assetsi,t + 8Change Tier 1i,t + 9Interest 
Incomei,t + 10GDPi,t + εi,t                                                                                                                       (1) 
 
where i,t  indicate, respectively, firm and year observations and all the variables have already 
been defined. Our research hypotheses predict a positive and significant α1 and an 
insignificant α2. When estimating (1) it is necessary to use a censored regression model 
because Securitization takes the value of zero for a large part of the sample and it is a 
continuous random variable over strictly positive values. As a consequence a linear model 
would not work properly (Wooldridge, 2002). 
The results from equation (1), reported in columns 1 in Panel B of Table III, strongly support 
H1 documenting a positive and significant relation between securitization and CEO’s equity 
incentives while no relation is detected between securitization and CEO’s risk incentives. 
Given the variability in the distribution of the dependent variable, it could be argued that 
results might be partially driven by some extreme observations. In order to address this 
concern we divide our sample in three groups and mark them with an ordering variable taking 
the value of: 
 
 1 if the bank does not engage into securitizations; 
 2 if the bank engages into securitizations and Securitization is below the sample 
median of securitizing institutions; 
 3 if the bank engages into securitizations and Securitization is above the sample 
median of securitizing institutions. 
 
We then fit equation (1) using an ordered probit model and present results in columns 2 of 
Table III, Panel B. The advantage of using this approach is that results cannot be driven by 
few outliers; nonetheless the use of an ordering variable reduces information available in the 
data. Column 3, instead, fits model (1) excluding observations in years 2008 and 2009. This 
additional analysis takes into consideration the fact that the securitization market has greatly 
reduced after 2007 because of the advent of the financial crisis. Also these alternative model 
specifications provide strong support for H1 suggesting that CEOs with high equity incentives 
have engaged in securitization transactions to a larger extent than CEOs whose wealth was 
less tightly linked to shareholder value. 
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Table III. Panel A tabulates the amount of securitization according to the quintile of the distribution of CEO’s 
equity incentives. Panel B reports estimate results from model (1). In Column 1 the dependent variable is the 
continuous variable Securitization, in Column 2 the dependent variables is an ordering variable taking the value 
of 1 if the banks has zero securitization, 2 if the amount of securitization is positive but below the median of 
securitizing banks and 3 otherwise; in Column 3 the sample is truncated at fiscal year 2007 and the dependent 
variable is Securitization. Tobit models are used in columns 1 and 3 while an ordered probit model is used in 
column 2. 
Securitization is the total amount of financial assets that have been transfer off-balance through securitization, 
divided by the amount of total loans managed; Equity Incentives is the logarithm of the dollar change in the value 
of CEO's stock and option holdings that would come from a one percentage point increase in the company stock 
price; Risk Incentives is the Vega of CEO’s stock options divided by their Delta; Log Age is the log 
transformation of CEO’s age; B_M is the book value of equity divided by its market value; Returns is annual 
returns; Size is the logarithm of total assets; Change Assets is the percentage change in total assets with 
respect to the previous year; Change Tier 1 is the percentage change in Tier 1 with respect to the previous year; 
Interest Income is net interest income standardized by total revenues; GDP is the Gross Domestic Product 
*,**,*** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard 
errors clustered at firm-level are reported in brackets. P-values are two tailed. 
Panel A
Securitization
Equity Incentives Quintile Mean (N=526)
Lowest 0.032
2nd quintile 0.070
3rd quintile 0.083
4th quintile 0.140
Highest 0.212
H0: Lowest - Highest = 0 t = - 7.038 p-value = 0.000
Panel B
Dependent Variable:
Equity Incentives 0.072*** 0.217*** 0.095***
[0.026] [0.083] [0.032]
Risk Incentives 0.026 0.069 0.017
[0.044] [0.142] [0.060]
Log Age -1.081*** -3.090*** -1.078***
[0.366] [1.036] [0.391]
B_M 0.081** 0.268** 0.235*
[0.033] [0.118] [0.127]
Returns 0.030 0.089 0.002
[0.045] [0.153] [0.106]
Size 0.098*** 0.412*** 0.079***
[0.024] [0.077] [0.029]
Change Assets 0.019 0.015 0.032
[0.118] [0.410] [0.122]
Change Tier 1 0.043 0.136 0.008
[0.076] [0.257] [0.104]
Interest Income -0.355 -0.886 -0.339
[0.226] [0.828] [0.255]
GDP -0.076 -0.096 -0.145
[0.151] [0.448] [0.088]
Year Dummies YES YES YES
Observations 526 526 387
(Pseudo) R
2
40.6% 25.7% 40.7%
Securitization 
Until 2007
Tobit 
(3)
TABLE III
(1)
Tobit
Securitization
(2)
Ordered Probit
Securitization
Continuous variable Three Groups
CEO Incentives and Securitization
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Results from Table III also show that banks with higher book-to-market ratios engage more in 
securitizations than financial institutions with lower book-to-market ratios. A possible 
explanation is that these banks have higher incentives to securitize loans because they have 
lower growth opportunities and thus more difficulties in collecting funds. Data also show that 
old CEOs undertake less securitizations than their young colleagues and this is consistent 
with young managers having higher career concerns and thus trying to boost shareholder 
value through securitizations to a larger extent.  
A possible concern that might arise when estimating equation (1) relates to the fact that 
CEO’s equity and risk incentives can be endogenous with respect to banks’ decision of 
engaging into securitizations. This is the case if exogenous shocks to the regression residuals 
affect both CEO’s compensation structure and securitization strategies. Moreover model (1) 
might be affected by a reverse causality bias. To address this problem we use an 
instrumental variable (IV) approach. It is well known that the challenge faced by researchers 
when dealing with IV models is to identify valid and strong instruments. These are variables 
that are strongly correlated with the endogenous variable under investigation but that are not 
correlated with the error term in the second stage equation7. In order to identify such an 
instrument we exploit a change in US GAAP that took place in 2000. Here it is important to 
note that the securitization business model and the subprime securitization market developed 
thanks to the possibility offered by SFAS 140 to retain interests in securitized assets as credit 
enhancement mechanism and applying sale accounting to the transferred assets. This was 
possible thanks to the Financial Components Concept included in SFAS 140. Without this 
concept most securitizations would have to be accounted for as secured borrowing. The 
Financial Components Concept has been introduced in 2000 by SFAS 140 while the prior 
SFAS 125, Accounting for Transfers and Servicing of Financial Assets and Extinguishment of 
Liabilities (1996) did not contain this provision. As a consequence, the recent securitization 
and subprime business model investigated in the paper has emerged after this change in 
accounting standards. Data reported in Table IV document that after the discussed change in 
accounting standards in 2000, the securitization market sharply increased, specifically the 
subprime securitization market that was almost non-existing beforehand. Thus we use as 
instrument for CEO’s equity and risk incentives during the period 2003-2009 the level of 
equity and risk incentives that the same CEO had before 20008. The level of incentives held 
by the CEO in the same bank (or in the other banks/firms in which she has served) before 
2000 is likely to be correlated with her future level of incentives but cannot be correlated with 
a securitization business model that did not exist9. 
Table V presents results from estimating model (1) using a two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
approach.  The high R2 reported in the first stage suggest that variables included in the model 
are good predictors of the endogenous variables. Estimate results from the second stage 
strongly corroborate findings reported in Table III and thus confirm the support to H1.  
 
                                                 
7
 See Larcker and Rusticus (2010) for a useful discussion of the use of instrumental variables in research 
8
 Due to data limitation we have considered compensation data back to 1992. 
9
 Even if data reported in Table IV corroborate the assumption that the securitization business model that has 
generated the financial crisis (and that is under investigation in this paper) came to existence only after the 
introduction of SFAS 140, we cannot ignore the fact that securitization transactions were also present before 
2000. As a consequence we acknowledge that our instruments are likely to be semi-endogenous and not 
perfectly exogenous (Larcker and Rusticus 2010).  
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   Table IV. Data have been retrieved from Inside Mortgage Finance Publication. MBS is the acronym of Mortgage-Backed Securities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dollars in Billions
Year Prime MBS Subprime MBS Total MBS
Average 1997-1999 
Prime MBS
Average 1997-1999 
Subprime  MBS
Average 1997-1999 
Total MBS
1997 423                66                    489              687                         70                            756                          
1998 860                83                    943              
1999 777                60                    837              
2001 1,246             98                    1,345           
2002 1,641             176                  1,817           
2003 2,393             269                  2,662           1,496                      444                          1,940                       
2004 1,306             521                  1,827           
2005 1,314             797                  2,112           
2006 1,202             814                  2,016           118% 539% 157%
2007 1,372             433                  1,804           
% Increase w.r.t. pre 2000
TABLE IV
Securitization of Home Mortgages pre and post 2000
Average 2001-2007 
Prime MBS
Average 2001-2007 
Subprime  MBS
Average 2001-2007 
Total MBS
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Table V. The table reports the first and second stage estimates from model (1) using a 2SLS approach. We use as instrument for CEO’s equity 
incentives the level of equity incentives the same CEO had before 2000 (Equity Incentives Prior 2000) and as instrument for CEO’s risk incentives the 
level of risk incentives the same CEO had before 2000 (Risk Incentives Prior 2000). 
Securitization is the total amount of financial assets that have been transfer off-balance through securitization, divided by the amount of total loans 
managed; Equity Incentives is the logarithm of the dollar change in the value of CEO's stock and option holdings that would come from a one 
percentage point increase in the company stock price; Risk Incentives is the Vega of CEO’s stock options divided by their Delta; Log Age is the log 
transformation of CEO’s age; B_M is the book value of equity divided by its market value; Returns is annual returns; Size is the logarithm of total 
assets; Change Assets is the percentage change in total assets with respect to the previous year; Change Tier 1 is the percentage change in Tier 1 
with respect to the previous year; Interest Income is net interest income standardized by total revenues; GDP is the Gross Domestic Product;  
*,**,*** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at firm-level are 
reported in brackets. P-values are two tailed. 
Dependent Variable: Securitization 
Until 2007
Tobit IV
Equity Incentives Prior 2000 0.639*** -0.032
[0.062] [0.026]
Risk Incentives Prior 2000 0.737*** 0.563***
[0.268] [0.114]
Equity Incentives 0.156** 0.606*** 0.163**
[0.062] [0.229] [0.072]
Risk Incentives 0.222 0.540 0.191
[0.316] [0.930] [0.322]
Log Age -1.329*** -4.317*** -1.329*** 1.988*** -0.022
[0.412] [1.217] [0.508] [0.477] [0.203]
B_M 0.087* 0.355** 0.209 -0.377*** 0.156***
[0.046] [0.166] [0.252] [0.079] [0.034]
Returns 0.060 0.040 0.304* 0.511*** -0.418***
[0.122] [0.375] [0.159] [0.189] [0.081]
Size 0.040 0.205 0.029 0.318*** 0.104***
[0.055] [0.171] [0.058] [0.036] [0.015]
Change Assets -0.045 -0.367 -0.023 1.388*** -0.360**
[0.164] [0.534] [0.204] [0.334] [0.142]
Change Tier 1 0.027 0.070 -0.095 0.337 0.002
[0.074] [0.252] [0.107] [0.313] [0.133]
Interest Income -0.337 -0.644 -0.344 -0.885** 0.347**
[0.273] [0.914] [0.329] [0.378] [0.161]
GDP -0.299 -0.854 -0.004 -0.165** 0.151***
[0.294] [0.845] [0.041] [0.077] [0.033]
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 526 526 387 526 526
(Pseudo) R
2
39.8% 26.3% 37.5% 54.3% 49.3%
TABLE V
CEO Incentives and Securitization with Endogeneity
Equity Incentives Risk IncentivesThree Groups
(4) (5)
Second Stage First Stage
Securitization
Continuous variable
Tobit IV
Securitization
(1) (2) (3)
Ordered Logit IV
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We now move the focus of the analysis from banks’ overall securitization activity to the quality 
of loans securitized and banks’ decision to transfer risks to outside investors through 
securitization. Table VI provides univariate support for our hypothesis that CEO’s equity and 
risk incentives motivate executives to securitize low-quality assets and transfer risk to outside 
investors through securitization. Specifically we divide the sample into four groups according 
to the median value of CEO’s equity and risk incentives (High vs Low)10. Table VI, Panel A 
tabulates the mean values of the percentage loss on securitized loans (Loss Secur) for each 
level of CEO’s incentives while Panel B tabulates the difference between the percentage loss 
on securitized loans and withheld loans (Diff in Losses). We interpret the first metric as a 
proxy for the riskiness of loans securitized because risky securitized loans are more likely to 
suffer credit losses. The second metric, instead, investigates the opportunistic behavior of 
CEOs when engaging into securitizations because it compares the losses recorded on loans 
transferred off-balance and losses on loans withheld in the balance sheet.  
 
 
 
 
Table VI.  The table has been created by classifying observations with available data on losses on securitized 
loans (N=162) into four groups (High/High, High/Low, Low/High, Low/Low) according to the median value of 
CEO’s equity and risk incentives. Panel A reports, for each group, the mean value of the percentage loss on 
securitized loans (Loss Secur) while Panel B reports the mean value of the difference between the percentage 
loss on securitized loans and withheld loans (Diff  in Losses).  
Equity Incentives is the logarithm of the dollar change in the value of CEO's stock and option holdings that would 
come from a one percentage point increase in the company stock price; Risk Incentives is the Vega of CEO’s 
stock options divided by their Delta. P-values are two tailed.  
                                                 
10
 The sample size is 162 because we have to restrict the analysis to those observations with available data on 
losses on securitized assets. 
Panel A
N= 162
High Low
High 0.031 0.017
Low 0.017 0.009
H0: (High/High) = (Low/Low) t = 3.301 p-value= 0.002
Panel B
N= 162
High Low
High 0.017 0.006
Low 0.003 0.003
H0: (High/High) = (Low/Low) t = 2.402 p-value= 0.020
TABLE VI
CEO Incentives and Losses on Securitization
Equity Incentives
Risk Incentives
Diff in Losses
Mean
Loss Secur
Mean
Risk Incentives
Equity Incentives
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Data from Table VI, Panel A indicate that financial institutions in which the CEO had high 
equity and risk incentives (group High/High) engaged in risky securitization transactions to a 
larger extent than banks in which the CEO had low incentives (group Low/Low). Similarly, 
Panel B shows that CEOs with high equity and risk incentives are more likely to transfer risk 
to outside investors than CEOs with low incentives as documented by the significantly higher 
value of Diff in Losses in the group High/High w.r.t. the group Low/Low. In order to better 
disentangle the effect of CEO’s equity and risk incentives on the quality of loans transferred 
through securitization we estimate the following model through 2SLS: 
 
Loss Secur (Diff in Losses)i,t = β0 + β 1Equity Incentivesi,t + β2Risk Incentivesi,t + β3Log Agei,t + 
β4B_Mi,t + β5Returnsi,t + β6Sizei,t + β7Change Assetsi,t + 
β8Change Tier 1i,t + β9Interest Incomei,t + β10GDPi,t + β11Loss 
Loansi,t + εi,t                                                                                                                          (2) 
 
Estimate results using Loss Secur as dependent variable are reported in Table VII, Columns 
1 while Columns 2 reports results from using Diff in Losses as dependent variable. The 
coefficients on Equity Incentives and Risk Incentives in the first column of the table indicate 
that CEOs with high equity and risk incentives tend to securitize risky loans that are more 
likely to record credit losses. Moreover, results from the second column provide evidence that 
equity and risk incentives motivate CEOs to transfer the riskiest loans to outside investors 
while keeping on balance sheet the safest ones. These results are consistent with both H1 
and H2 claiming that CEOs incentivized on equity and risk are motivated to engage in risky 
lending activities and to use securitization as an accounting tool for hiding the risk generated 
from the balance sheet. Thus the analysis provides evidence that CEO’s equity and risk 
incentives motivated executives to opportunistically clean their balance sheets from undesired 
risks through securitization. Ex post, it is possible to affirm that securitization practices were 
effective in hiding the risks undertaken by CEOs  since neither banks’ investors nor analysts 
were able to understand the risks embedded in securitization transactions and in the 
underlying lending activity. 
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Table VII.  The table reports second-stage estimate results from model (2) estimated through 2SLS.  
In the untabulated first-stage we use as instrument for CEO’s equity incentives the level of equity incentives the 
same CEO had before 2000 and as instrument for CEO’s risk incentives the level of risk incentives the same 
CEO had before 2000. 
Loss Secur is the percentage of credit losses on securitized loans; Diff  in Losses is the difference between the 
percentage loss on securitized loans and the percentage loss on withheld loans; Equity Incentives is the 
logarithm of the dollar change in the value of CEO's stock and option holdings that would come from a one 
percentage point increase in the company stock price; Risk Incentives is the Vega of CEO’s stock options 
divided by their Delta; Log Age is the log transformation of CEO’s age; B_M  is the book value of equity divided 
by its market value; Returns is annual returns; Size is the logarithm of total assets; Change Assets is the 
percentage change in total assets with respect to the previous year; Change Tier 1 is the percentage change in 
Tier 1 with respect to the previous year; Interest Income is net interest income standardized by total revenues; 
GDP is the Gross Domestic Product; Loss Secur is the percentage of credit losses on withheld loans. 
*,**,*** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard 
errors clustered at firm-level are reported in brackets. P-values are two tailed. The sample includes securitizers 
with available data on losses recorded on securitized loans. 
Dependent Variable:
Equity Incentives 0.008** 0.007**
[0.004] [0.003]
Risk Incentives 0.025** 0.025**
[0.011] [0.011]
Log Age -0.064*** -0.060***
[0.022] [0.020]
B_M -0.000 -0.000
[0.001] [0.001]
Returns 0.001 0.002
[0.007] [0.007]
Size -0.002 -0.002
[0.004] [0.004]
Change Assets 0.014 0.018
[0.014] [0.013]
Change Tier 1 0.019 0.019
[0.011] [0.011]
Interest Income 0.003 0.008
[0.020] [0.019]
GDP -0.010** -0.012**
[0.005] [0.004]
Loss Loans 0.812***
[0.202]
Year Dummies YES YES
Observations 162 162
R
2
43.6% 19.0%
TABLE VII
CEO Incentives and Risky Securitization
(1) (2)
Loss Secur Diff in Losses
2SLS 2SLS
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Results from the previous analyses suggest that CEO’s equity incentives are both a 
determinant of banks’ overall securitization activities and the riskiness of securitized loans 
while CEO’s risk incentives only determine the risk profile of securitization. We further 
investigate this point by retrieving data on financial institutions most involved in the 
securitization of subprime loans. Subprime loans are made to those who have impaired credit 
and their securitization is the riskiest form of securitization transactions undertaken by 
financial institutions. Typically, subprime borrowers have low credit ratings and a reasonable 
chance of defaulting on the debt repayment: as a consequence, financial institutions charge 
significantly higher rates on subprime loans than prime mortgages. This allows banks to 
increase their profits from the lending activity and also provides banks with high incentives to 
include these loans in securitization transactions in order to transfer the associated high risk 
to outside investors. We retrieve data on the top subprime securitizers from the Mortgage 
Market Statistical Annual edited by Inside Mortgage Finance Publications. We have data on 
top subprime securitizers for the period 2000-2007. Even if the Mortgage Market Statistical 
Annual only reports data for the top financial institutions involved in subprime securitizations it 
has a very wide coverage of the securitization market with top subprime securitizers disclosed 
in the dataset covering more than the 80% of overall subprime market. We define a dummy 
variable (Top Subprime) taking the value of 1 if the financial institution is listed in the 
Mortgage Market Statistical Annual as top subprime securitizer at least once during the period 
analyzed, zero otherwise. Table VIII, Panel A compares the percentage of top subprime 
observations according to the level of CEO’s equity and risk incentives. Two-sample tests of 
proportion indicates that in the presence of high CEO’s equity and risk incentives the 
percentage of top subprime securitizers is significantly higher than in the presence of low 
CEO’s incentives.   
 
 
 
Table VIII. Panel A.  The table has been created by classifying observations into four groups (High/High, 
High/Low, Low/High, Low/Low) according to the median value of CEO’s equity and risk incentives. A financial 
institution is classified as top subprime securitizer if it is disclosed as such in the Mortgage Market Statistical 
Annual edited by Inside Mortgage Finance Publications. Equity Incentives is the logarithm of the dollar change in 
the value of CEO's stock and option holdings that would come from a one percentage point increase in the 
company stock price; Risk Incentives is the Vega of CEO’s stock options divided by their Delta. 
P-values are two tailed and are based on two-sample tests of proportion. The sample includes 526 firm-year 
observations. 
Panel A
High Low
High 46% 38%
Low 16% 0%
H0: (High/High) = (Low/Low) z = 5.550 p-value <  0.000
TABLE VIII
CEO Incentives and Subprime Securitization
% Top Subprime
Risk Incentives
Equity Incentives
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Table VIII. Panel B. The table reports second-stage estimate results from probit model (3) estimated through 
2SLS. In the untabulated first-stage we use as instrument for CEO’s equity incentives the level of equity 
incentives the same CEO had before 2000 and as instrument for CEO’s risk incentives the level of risk 
incentives the same CEO had before 2000. 
Top Subprime is a dummy equal to one if the financial institution is listed as top subprime securitizer in the 
Mortgage Market Statistical Annual during the period 2000-2007; Equity Incentives is the logarithm of the dollar 
change in the value of CEO's stock and option holdings that would come from a one percentage point increase 
in the company stock price; Risk Incentives is the Vega of CEO’s stock options divided by their Delta; Log Age is 
the log transformation of CEO’s age; B_M is the book value of equity divided by its market value; Returns is 
annual returns; Size is the logarithm of total assets; Change Assets is the percentage change in total assets with 
respect to the previous year; Change Tier 1 is the percentage change in Tier 1 with respect to the previous year; 
Interest Income is net interest income standardized by total revenues; GDP is the Gross Domestic Product.  
*,**,*** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.  
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at firm-level are reported in brackets. P-values are two 
tailed. 
Panel B
Dependent Variable:
Equity Incentives 1.065*** 0.936*** 0.915*** 0.911**
[0.361] [0.331] [0.298] [0.387]
Risk Incentives 3.797*** 3.535** 2.708** 3.460*
[1.471] [1.714] [1.284] [1.845]
Log Age -1.908 0.114 -0.643 0.216
[2.550] [2.149] [2.201] [2.825]
B_M -0.051 1.868*** -0.102* 2.590**
[0.052] [0.715] [0.060] [1.143]
Returns 1.109* 1.840** 0.794 3.048**
[0.640] [0.872] [0.695] [1.232]
Size 0.271 0.602*** 0.467** 0.487**
[0.243] [0.205] [0.221] [0.205]
Change Assets 0.099 0.848 0.835 0.071
[0.812] [0.937] [0.912] [1.183]
Change Tier 1 0.470 -0.569 1.383* 0.330
[0.607] [0.554] [0.715] [0.850]
Interest Income -0.247 -0.620 0.644 -0.761
[1.566] [1.535] [1.724] [1.688]
GDP -4.474*** -2.838** -4.855*** -1.925*
[1.305] [1.355] [1.621] [1.096]
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES
Observations 526 387 208 163
Pseudo R
2
61.8% 68.4% 50.1% 58.6%
(3) (4)
2SLS 2SLS
(2)
Top Subprime
(1)
Full Sample
Full Sample 
Until 2007
2SLS 2SLS
TABLE VIII
Subprime Securitization
Top Subprime Top Subprime Top Subprime
Only 
Securitizers
Only 
Securitizers 
Until 2007
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To investigate in a multivariate setting if CEO’s equity and risk incentives increase banks’ 
probability of being a securitizer of subprime loans we estimate model (1) through 2SLS using 
as dependent variable the dummy Top Subprime above defined: 
 
Top Subprimei,t = γ0 + γ1Equity Incentivesi,t + γ2Risk Incentivesi,t +  γ3Log Agei,t + γ4B_Mi,t + 
γ5Returnsi,t + γ6Sizei,t + γ7Change Assetsi,t + γ8Change Tier 1i,t+ γ9Interest 
Incomei,t+ γ10GDPi,t + εi,t                                                                                                                (3) 
 
Estimate results are reported in Table VIII, Panel B. Column 1 presents results for the full 
sample, column 2 restricts the sample to 2007, column 3 uses the full time period but tabulate 
results using only securitizing banks, and the last column uses securitizing financial 
institutions only and restricts the sample to 2007. Results on CEO’s equity and risk incentives 
corroborate findings from panel A and suggest that CEOs with high equity and risk incentives 
are more likely to engage in the securitization of subprime loans than executives with low 
incentives. Therefore results support both H1 and H2 pointing out to the pivotal role of CEO’s 
equity and risk incentives in boosting risky securitizations.  
In order to further investigate the opportunistic behavior of highly incentivized CEOs when 
engaging into securitizations, we analyze bank’s disclosure about the amount of losses 
recorded by loans that have been transferred off-balance. SFAS 140 explicitly requires an 
entity that securitizes financial assets to disclose information about the quality of securitized 
assets, including the amount of credit losses11. Specifically we investigate if CEOs with high 
equity and risk incentives not only engage in risky securitization transactions but also hide the 
quality of loans securitized by providing external investors with less information about the 
riskiness of securitizations undertaken. For doing so we analyze the disclosure provided by 
financial institutions in their financial statements and score the quality of information on losses 
recorded on securitized loans on a 4-points scale as follows (Disclosure Index): 
 
- 4 points if the amount of losses on securitized assets is disclosed in a table and the 
information is provided for each type of securitized asset (e.g. mortgages, credit cards 
etc…); 
- 3 points if the amount of losses on securitized assets is disclosed in a table but the 
information is only provided at an aggregate level; 
- 2 points if the amount of losses on securitized assets is not disclosed in a table and it 
has to be indirectly retrieved from information provided in the financial statements; 
- 1 point if it is not possible to understand the amount of losses on securitized assets. 
 
The median value of the Disclosure Index is 2.21 with a standard deviation of 1.06. In order to 
investigate the role of CEOs equity and risk incentives on the quality of information provided 
to investors, we estimate the following ordered probit model through 2SLS: 
 
Disclosure Indexi,t = δ0 + δ1Equity Incentivesi,t + δ2Risk Incentivesi,t + δ3Log Agei,t + δ4B_Mi,t + 
δ5Returnsi,t + δ6Sizei,t +  δ7Change Assetsi,t  + δ8Change Tier 1i,t + δ9Interest 
Incomei,t + δ10GDPi,t + εi,t                                                                                                                     (4) 
 
Estimate results are reported in Table IX. The coefficient on CEO’s risk incentives is negative 
and significant indicating that CEOs with high risk incentives not only securitize risky loans to 
                                                 
11
 Also in this case the requirement applies to securitizations with retained interests. 
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a larger extent than CEOs with lower incentives but they also provide external investors with 
lower information about the quality of loans securitized. On the contrary, we do not find the 
same effect when examining CEO’s equity incentives. This last result nicely fits with findings 
from Table V that suggested that CEO’s equity incentives, contrary to risk incentives, 
determine overall securitization activity and not only the securitization of risky loans. Results 
reported in Table IX further confirm the opportunistic behavior of CEOs when they engage 
into securitization transaction motivated by the structure of their incentive scheme.  
 
 
 
Table IX.  The table reports second-stage estimate results from the ordered probit model (4) estimated through 
2SLS. In the untabulated first-stage we use as instrument for CEO’s equity incentives the level of equity 
incentives the same CEO had before 2000 and as instrument for CEO’s risk incentives the level of risk 
incentives the same CEO had before 2000. 
Disclosure Index is a 4-point-scale variable that classifies the quality of information provided by the financial 
institution about the amount of losses recorded by securitized loans; Equity Incentives is the logarithm of the 
dollar change in the value of CEO's stock and option holdings that would come from a one percentage point 
increase in the company stock price; Risk Incentives is the Vega of CEO’s stock options divided by their Delta; 
Log Age is the log transformation of CEO’s age; B_M is the book value of equity divided by its market value; 
Returns is annual returns; Size is the logarithm of total assets; Change Assets is the percentage change in total 
assets with respect to the previous year; Change Tier 1 is the percentage change in Tier 1 with respect to the 
previous year; Interest Income is net interest income standardized by total revenues; GDP is the Gross Domestic 
Product.  
Dependent Variable:
Equity Incentives 0.134
[0.105]
Risk Incentives -1.857**
[0.731]
Log Age -0.608
[1.553]
B_M 0.216*
[0.128]
Returns -0.593
[0.584]
Size 0.324**
[0.143]
Change Assets -2.897***
[0.746]
Change Tier 1 -0.925
[0.634]
Interest Income -0.335
[1.431]
GDP 4.349***
[1.638]
Year Dummies YES
Observations 208
Pseudo R
2
8.2%
TABLE IX
CEO Incentives and Disclosure
Disclosure Index
2SLS
Please do not quote, cite, distribute or copy without the consent of the authors 
 
 
24 
*,**,*** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard 
errors clustered at firm-level are reported in brackets. P-values are two tailed. The sample only includes 
securitizers. 
Finally, we test if banks involved in the subprime securitization indeed over performed other financial institutions 
before the crash of the subprime market in 2007 and if this relation changed once the subprime crisis has blew 
up. To shed light on this issue we analyze how stock returns and earnings per share of top subprime securitizers 
changed before and after 2007 with respect to other financial institution. Specifically, we fit the following OLS 
model in which the variable Crisis is a dummy that takes the value of 1 in years 2007-2009, zero otherwise, and 
Performance is either annual market returns or earnings per share (EPS). 
 
Performancei,t = λ0 + λ1Crisisi,t + λ2Top Subprimei,t + λ3Crisis*Top Subprimei,t + λ4B_Mi,t + 
λ5Sizei,t + λ6Change Assetsi,t + λ7Change Tier 1i,t + λ8Interest Incomei,t + 
λ9Securitizationi,t + εi,t                                                                                                                                (5) 
 
Estimate results are reported in Table X, Columns 1 and 2. The positive and significant 
coefficient on Top Subprime indicates that subprime securitizers, before 2007, have 
performed much better than the other financial institutions. The negative coefficient on the 
dummy marking years 2007-2009 confirms the strong reduction in market returns and 
earnings recorded by all financial institutions with the advent of the credit crisis. Interestingly 
the interaction term between Top Subprime and the crisis dummy is negative and significant, 
thus suggesting that the decrease in performance after 2007 has been more severe for banks 
that had engaged in the securitization of non-agency loans. These results further corroborates 
the role of subprime securitization in boosting stock prices and earnings before the advent of 
the subprime mortgage crisis and in deteriorating performance once the market has crashed.  
Finally, Table X, Column 3 analyzes dividend distribution. This analysis is particularly 
interesting since dividend polices represent the core of the shareholder-bondholder conflict 
that is exacerbated in the presence of incentives that align executives’ interests with those of 
shareholders. Results indicate that subprime securitizers distributed more dividends than 
other financial institutions before the beginning of the crisis while they did not reduced 
dividend distribution on the immediately subsequent period. Overall results presented are in 
line with the idea that the securitization of risky loans has allowed banks and shareholders to 
pursue their private interest while accumulating and hiding risks that ex-post have been paid 
by the whole system. 
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Table X. The table reports OLS estimate results from model (5). Market returns are monthly returns cumulated 
over the year; EPS is earnings per share, Dividends is dividends per share; Crisis is a dummy variable taking the 
value of 1 in years 2007-2009, zero otherwise; Top subprime is a dummy equal to one if the financial institution 
is listed as Top Subprime securitizer in the Mortgage Market Statistical Annual; B_M is the book value of equity 
divided by its market value; Size is the logarithm of total assets; Change Assets is the percentage change in 
total assets with respect to the previous year; Change Tier 1 is the percentage change in Tier 1 with respect to 
the previous year; Interest Income is net interest income standardized by total revenues; Securitization is the 
total amount of financial assets that have been transfer off-balance through securitization, divided by the amount 
of total loans managed. 
*,**,*** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard 
errors clustered at firm-level are reported in brackets. P-values are two tailed. 
 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we empirically investigate the role of CEO’s equity and risk-related incentives in 
boosting securitization activities and in transferring risk to outside investor through the 
securitization of risky loans.  
Crisis -0.176*** -0.966*** 0.041
[0.023] [0.337] [0.043]
Top Subprime 0.107*** 2.068*** 0.341*
[0.036] [0.526] [0.178]
Top Subprime * Crisis -0.158* -2.801** 0.189
[0.080] [1.331] [0.141]
B_M -0.192*** -1.428*** -0.127***
[0.026] [0.335] [0.035]
Size -0.030** 0.087 0.186***
[0.013] [0.116] [0.038]
Change Assets 0.124 1.633* -0.582***
[0.079] [0.828] [0.141]
Change Tier 1 0.219*** 1.038 0.017
[0.082] [0.669] [0.098]
Interest Income 0.029 0.156 0.689***
[0.129] [0.955] [0.233]
Securitization 0.071 0.462 -0.310
[0.063] [0.908] [0.234]
Observations 526 526 526
R
2
34.8% 39.8% 39.3%
Dividends
(3)
TABLE X
Securitization and Performance
(1) (2)
EPSMarket Returns
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Using a sample of US financial institution over the period 2003-2009, we document that CEOs 
with high equity incentives systematically engaged in securitization transactions to a larger 
extent than CEOs with low equity incentives. We also show that CEO’s with high equity and 
risk-related incentives engaged more in risky securitization activities than CEOs with low 
incentives and transferred risk to outside investors by moving off-balance the riskiest loans. 
Moreover, we show that executives incentivized on risk provided outside investors with a low 
quality disclosure about losses recorded on loans that were securitized thus contributing to 
increase the opacity of transactions undertaken. We interpret these results as evidence that 
highly incentivized CEOs saw securitization as a useful tool to enhance banks’ profits and 
stock price. Moreover, we argue that risk-incentivized executives saw in securitizations an 
opportunity to hide the risks generated while betting on them.  
In additional analyses we document that subprime securitizers over-performed the peers 
before the market crash in 2007 while they underperformed other financial institutions once 
the subprime market collapsed. Moreover, subprime securitizers were able to distribute more 
dividends than the other financial institutions. Overall, our results speak to the role of equity 
and risk incentives in motivating CEOs to engage in securitization activities and show that 
these widely used incentive tools had the consequences of boosting financial transactions 
that turned out to be extremely costly. 
Our contribution, therefore, adds to the large stream of research warning about possible side 
effects of equity compensation and uncovers a determinant of securitization transactions that 
has been overlooked by previous literature.  
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APPENDIX A 
Estimates of a stock option’s sensitivity to stock price are calculated based on the Black-
Scholes (1973) formula for valuing European call options, as modified to account for dividend 
payout by Merton (1973). 
 
Option Value = [S e-dT N(Z) – Xe –rT N(Z-σT(1/2)] 
 
 
 
Where 
Z = [ln(S/X) + T (r – d + σ2/2]/σT(1/2) 
N = cumulative probability function for the normal distribution 
S = price of the underlying stock 
X = exercise price of the option 
σ = expected stock-return volatility over the life of the option 
r = risk-free interest rate 
d = expected dividend yield over the life of the option 
 
 
The sensitivity with respect to a 1% change in stock price is defined as: 
 
[δ(option value)/ δ(price)*(price/100) = e-dT * N(Z) * (price/100) 
 
 
The sensitivity with respect to a 0.01 change in stock price volatility is defined as: 
[δ(option value)/ δ(volatility)]*0.01 = e-dT * N’(Z) * ST1/2*0.01 
 
 
where N’ is the normal density function. 
